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CORPORATE LOAN SECURITIZATION:
SELECTED LEGAL AND REGULATORY
ISSUES*
THOMAS W. ALBRECHT** AND SARAH J. SMITH***
I.  INTRODUCTION
The past three years have witnessed significant developments in
the use of securitization as a financing technique.  A form of financ-
ing that was initially used to finance relatively simple, self-liquidating
assets such as mortgage loans has expanded in its application, and is
now frequently employed in more complicated financing structures.1
For example, risk in project lending is now being securitized, and,
more importantly for the purposes of this Article, securitization is
being employed by banks and finance companies to finance more in-
dividualized credits such as corporate loans.  The resulting securitiza-
tion structures are complicated, primarily as a result of the require-
ment within a securitization transaction to produce a structure that
insulates investors against a multiplicity of risks.  Credit risk, market
risk and liquidity risk are all possible consequences, and when re-
tained by the original lending institution, would be managed on an
institutional basis, and supported by the institution’s equity base.2
The more complicated the securitized asset and the less uniform its
characteristics, the more difficult it is to achieve the balance required
to satisfy investor concerns.  Nonetheless, the number and size of as-
set-backed issuances in the past two years in particular, appear to
signal another significant move in the on-going process of disinter-
*Note: Many of the citations in this article refer to English cases.  Since it is the policy of the
Journal that text and footnotes conform to the latest edition of The Bluebook: A Uniform Sys-
tem of Citation and The Chicago Manual of Style (16th ed. 1996), citations for these cases may
not adhere to the traditional English form.
**Partner, Sidley & Austin, Member of the Illinois Bar.
***Partner, Sidley & Austin, Solicitor of the Supreme Court of England & Wales.
1.  See, e.g., Cash Flow CBO/CLO Transaction Rating Criteria: 1996 Update, STANDARD
& POOR’S STRUCTURED FINANCE, Nov. 1996; Slicing Up Bank Loans, INVESTMENT DEALER’S
DIGEST, Dec. 22, 1997.
2. See id.
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mediation in today’s capital markets.
The objective of this Article is to indicate the legal issues that
commonly arise in the securitization of corporate credits.  It is impos-
sible in a brief Article such as this to focus on particular legal re-
quirements in particular jurisdictions.  Rather, this Article presents a
summary of the types of issues that arise commonly in certain juris-
dictions.
II.  WHY SECURITIZE?  REGULATORY CAPITAL
REQUIREMENTS
This Article focuses on the securitization of corporate loans
originated by banks and other financial institutions.  The first ques-
tion in relation to such assets is this: why do the originators of the as-
sets want to securitize them?  More so than other bank assets (in par-
ticular consumer assets such as mortgage loans and credit card
receivables), corporate loans derive from hard won relationships be-
tween lenders and their corporate customers.  Some of these custom-
ers have sufficient credit-worthiness to access the bond markets in
their own right, particularly since the advent of the junk bond and the
expansion in the private placement markets.  Any decision by a bank
or finance company to securitize its corporate credits is usually the
outcome of a delicate balance between the benefits of maintaining a
business relationship with its corporate customers, and thus carrying
corporate loans on its balance sheet, and the cost savings, increase in
return on equity, and funding diversity that can be achieved through
securitization.  Pivotal in this decision, however, will be a desire not
to upset the existing commercial relationship between lender and
borrower.
Banks and other credit institutions are subject to stringent capi-
tal and capital adequacy requirements.3  Until the late 1980s, bank
capital requirements were established independently by the regula-
tory authorities from around the world, without formal regard to
each other’s approach.  The increased globalization of the financial
3. See generally BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, Proposal for International Convergence
of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, COMM. ON BANKING REGULATIONS AND
SUPERVISORY PRACTICES CONSULTATIVE PAPER 1 (1987), reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 530 (1988)
[hereinafter Basle Accord].  The Committee was established in 1975, and has been variously
referred to as the Basle Committee, the Basle Supervisors’ Committee and the Cooke Commit-
tee, after its second chairman,  Peter Cooke, the former Head of Banking Supervision at the
Bank of England.  See Cynthia C. Lichtenstein, Introductory Note, 30 I.L.M. 967 (1991).
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markets rendered this dislocated method of supervision less and less
relevant to the business, and the risks, that banks were undertaking.
In recognition of the increasing need to establish common criteria to
measure the financial soundness of a credit institution, as well as to
reduce competitive inequalities caused by the application of different
supervisory standards, the G10 nations (under the auspices of the
Bank for International Settlements and the Basle Committee on
Banking Supervision) agreed upon a common approach to the meas-
urement of bank capital and a methodology for the weighting of bank
assets for risk-based capital purposes.4
The Basle Accord approaches the measurement of bank capital
adequacy by categorizing the types of capital maintained by a bank
under three general headings.5  The first type, or Tier 1 capital, repre-
sents the most permanent forms of capital, such as ordinary shares or
common stock, non-cumulative perpetual preferred stock, and dis-
closed reserves.6  The second type of capital, or Tier 2 capital, repre-
sents less permanent forms of capital, or capital that carries a fixed or
cumulative cost, such as general provisions, redeemable preference
shares, cumulative preferred stock, hybrid (debt/equity) instruments
or subordinated debt.7  The third type, or Tier 3 capital, is a new addi-
tion to the Basle Accord agreed upon in 1996.  Compared with the
more permanent Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital held to support losses on
longer-dated, illiquid bank assets,8 Tier 3 capital represents the types
of less permanent, more fluid capital (such as short-dated subordi-
nated debt) retained to cover losses on trading activities and other
market-related risks. The Basle Accord, however, takes care not to
attempt to draft exclusive definitions of capital.  Capital can take dif-
ferent forms under various legal, accounting and economic systems.
In order for the Basle Accord to have practical application in each
jurisdiction in which it is applied, its requirements for the compo-
nents of capital are set out in a purposeful or functional way.9
4. See id.
5. See Basle Accord, supra note 3, Section I. See also BASLE COMM. ON BANKING
SUPERVISION, Amendment to the Capital Accord to Incorporate Market Risks, (Jan. 1996), Sec-
tion II (on file with the International Financial and Tax Law Unit, Centre for Commercial Law
Studies, Queen Mary and Westfield College, University of London) [hereinafter Capital Ac-
cord Amendment].
6. See Basle Accord, supra note 3, Annex 1, Parts A and D(i).
7. See Basle Accord, supra note 3, Annex 1, Parts A and D(ii).
8. See Capital Accord Amendment, supra note 5, Definition of Capital, Section II, n.2.
9. See, e.g., Basle Accord, supra note 3, para. 14.  Hence the focus in the Basle Accord is
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The Basle Accord further refines its definition of qualifying (i.e.
qualifying capital for the purposes of measuring the ratio of capital to
weighted risk assets of a bank) by setting limits on the types of capital
available for inclusion in the calculation of the ratio.  For example,
Tier 2 capital may not exceed one hundred percent of total Tier 1
capital,10 and subordinated debt may not constitute more than fifty
percent of Tier 1 capital.11  Tier 3 capital is limited to supporting the
“trading book” (market risk) activities of a bank, and should not ex-
ceed 250 percent of a bank’s Tier 1 capital required to support mar-
ket risks.12  General provisions included in Tier 2 capital should not
exceed 1.25% of weighted risk assets.13
The other side of the calculation of a bank’s capital adequacy is
represented by its assets. The calculation of a bank’s capital adequacy
requirement is intended primarily to ensure that banks have suffi-
cient capital available to support or absorb the risk of losses should
their assets fail to perform.14  By far the greatest type of risk incurred
in carrying on a banking business is the credit risk inherent in the
holding of long-dated assets, particularly since the principal funding
source of most banks traditionally has been short-dated deposits.  In
general, Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital is intended as a buffer against credit
losses that may be incurred on traditional, long-dated, illiquid bank
assets such as corporate loans and syndicated credits.  The Basle Ac-
cord is based on the premise that the amount of capital required to be
held against the credit risk associated with an asset, such as a loan,
depends upon the perceived creditworthiness of the bank’s counter-
party.15
The categories of risk-weighting developed for counterparty risk
are based on very rudimentary principles, essentially on the per-
ceived likelihood of default by the category of counterparty in ques-
tion.  For example, all claims against or collateralized by countries
that are members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) are risk-weighted at zero percent, and all
on the constituents of capital, i.e., the key elements that capital is required to contain in order
that it may serve its function as protection for depositors and other creditors of banks and the
banking system as a whole.
10. See Basle Accord, supra note 3, para. 44.  See also id., Annex I, Part B.
11. See Basle Accord, supra note 3, para. 23.  See also id., Annex I, Part B.
12. See Capital Accord Amendment, supra note 8, para. 1.
13. See Basle Accord, supra note 3, para. 21.  See also id., Annex I, Part B.
14. See id.
15. See Basle Accord, supra note 3, para. 28.
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claims on corporates are risk-weighted at one hundred percent, re-
gardless of whether the corporate in question is a Fortune 500 corpo-
ration or a small, family-owned company.16  The approach taken by
the Basle Accord, therefore, is significantly less sophisticated than
the process of credit analysis that a bank would undertake itself be-
fore granting facilities to a corporate borrower.  The risk-weighted
value of an asset for capital adequacy purposes is calculated by mul-
tiplying the principal amount of the asset by the risk-weighting of the
associated counterparty.17  Off-balance sheet assets, such as bank
guarantees, letters of credit, note issuance facilities and committed
but undrawn lines of credit, are allocated a credit conversion factor.
This is expressed in percentage terms by reference to the perceived
credit risk arising from the nature of the off-balance sheet item in
question.18  The face amount of the off-balance sheet item is multi-
plied first by the credit conversion factor, and the result of this cal-
culation is then itself multiplied by the risk-weighting of the bank’s
counterparty.19
A bank’s capital adequacy requirement for assets held in its
banking book under the Basle Accord (excluding capital required to
be held against foreign exchange risk, which is the subject of a sepa-
rate calculation)20 is determined by. calculating the ratio of total
qualifying Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital against the total of its risk-
weighted assets, both on and off-balance sheet.21  The Basle Accord
sets a minimum capital/risk asset ratio of eight percent.22  This is
strictly a minimum requirement, and individual regulators are enti-
tled to set higher capital ratio requirements if they so desire.
Banks incorporated in a member state of the European Union
are subject to very similar requirements to those established by the
Basle Accord.  These requirements are found in three directives: the
Own Funds Directive,23 the Solvency Ratio Directive,24 and the Capi-
16. See Basle Accord, supra note 3, para. 28.  See also id., Annex 2.
17. See id.
18. See id.  See also Basle Accord, supra note 3, paras. 42 and 43, and Annex 3.
19. See id.  See also Basle Accord, supra note 3, Annex 3.
20. See Capital Accord Amendment, supra note 8, Section A.3.
21. See Basle Accord, supra note 3, para. 44.
22. See id.
23. Council Directive 89/299/EEC, 1989 O.J. (L 124) 16 [hereinafter Own Funds Direc-
tive] establishes the parameters for Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital.
24. Council Directive 89/647/EEC, 1989 O.J. (L 386) 14 [hereinafter Solvency Ratio Di-
rective] establishes the criteria for the risk-weighting of bank assets and off-balance sheet
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tal Adequacy Directive.25  As with the Basle Accord, the three direc-
tives set a minimum capital/risk asset ratio of eight percent for credit
institutions incorporated in a member state,26 though the institutions
are subject to lower requirements for capital supporting market risks
on more liquid assets held in the trading book.27  The three directives
are required to be implemented by each of the fifteen member states,
although a number of those states have been given individual exemp-
tions from immediate implementation of certain items.28  Most mem-
ber states had implemented the requirements of all three directives
by the beginning of 1998.29
As with much European Council legislation implemented in the
financial services sector, the three directives relating to capital ade-
quacy establish only the minimum regulatory requirements.  Any
member state may impose stricter criteria on banks incorporated in
that country and subject to its supervisory jurisdiction.30  The United
Kingdom is one member state that has taken advantage of this rule.
The principal bank regulatory authority in the United Kingdom, the
Bank of England, continues the practice implemented prior to the in-
troduction of the Basle Accord of setting a target and trigger risk as-
set ratio for each bank subject to its supervision.31  These ratios are
set according to the business in which each particular bank is en-
gaged, and the Bank of England’s view of the degree of risk associ-
ated with that business.32  As a result, there is probably not a single
U.K. bank whose capital/risk asset ratio requirement is eight percent;
most are likely to be subject to ratio requirements of at least ten per-
cent.
items.
25. Council Directive 93/6/EEC, 1993 O.J. (L 141) 1 [hereinafter Capital Adequacy Direc-
tive] sets capital requirements for foreign exchange risk in respect of all assets, as well as capi-
tal requirements for market risk in relation to assets in the trading book, and for underwriting
and associated market-related activities.
26. See Solvency Ratio Directive, supra note 24, art. 10(1).
27. See Capital Adequacy Directive, supra note 25, art. 4.  For more detailed information
on the EC capital adequacy requirements, see MARC DASSESSE ET AL., EC BANKING LAW
(2nd ed. 1994).
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See, e.g., Solvency Ratio Directive, supra note 24, art. 10(2); Capital Adequacy Direc-
tive, supra note 25, art. 1(2).
31. See, e.g., Statement of Principles issued in May 1993 by the Bank of England pursuant
to the Banking Act 1987 (on file with authors).  See also Banking Coordination Regulations
1992, paras. 2.13, 2.14 and 2.15 [hereinafter Second Council Directive].
32. See id.
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Corporate loans are relatively expensive items, in terms of capi-
tal, to hold on a bank’s balance sheet, because they are risk-weighted
at one hundred percent, irrespective of the actual credit quality of the
counterparty.  Corporate loans are more expensive to hold on the
balance sheet than, for example, residential mortgage loans secured
by a first ranking security interest, an asset type that is risk-weighted
at fifty percent, and which has long been securitized.33  Banks which
are focused on increasing return on equity and reducing the cost of
capital have been assessing the possibilities of securitizing their cor-
porate loan book for some time.  Until very recently, however, very
few supervisory authorities had published the criteria that must be
satisfied in order for a transfer of assets (or the credit risk associated
with assets) to be treated as a clean transfer for the purposes of a
bank’s capital/risk asset ratio requirement.  So new is this technology
that securitization structures involving corporate loan assets are still
reviewed on a case-by-case basis by the regulator.
A.  Specific Regulatory Concerns
The complexity of a securitization structure generally depends
on two factors: the complexity of the underlying assets and the com-
plexity of the funding side of the structure.  For the purposes of this
Article, it is assumed that asset-backed securities are issued by a
bankruptcy-remote special purpose vehicle (SPV).  In a classic securi-
tization structure, the assets to be securitized would be transferred by
the originator of those assets (Originator) to the SPV pursuant to a
“true sale,” i.e., a sale in law that constituted a transfer of rights and
property that would be upheld even if the Originator were subse-
quently to go bankrupt.  The SPV would benefit from credit en-
hancement and liquidity facilities, provided either by external third
parties (such as financial institutions which provide a first loss letter
of credit, or short-term liquidity facilities) or from within the struc-
ture itself.  Internal credit enhancement would be achieved, for ex-
ample, through the issuance of subordinated classes of securities or
the use of excess cash (spread) generated by the portfolio of securi-
tized assets.  Alternatively, the SPV might rely on a combination of
both internal and external enhancement.  In a traditional securitiza-
tion structure, the SPV will not have any credit risk exposure to the
33. Basle Accord, supra note 3, para. 41 and Annex 2.  See also Solvency Ratio Directive,
supra note 24, art. 6(1)(c).
ALBRECHT6MACRO1.DOC 12/16/98  12:47 PM
418 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 8:411
Originator, unless the Originator’s own independent debt rating at
least matches the debt rating of the most senior tranche of debt is-
sued by the SPV.  Traditional securitization structures such as those
described above have had to be adapted to address legal and struc-
tural issues arising from corporate loan assets, as summarized below.
1.  Revolving Credits.  Corporate loan assets can take a variety of
different forms.  The simplest type of loan asset is a fully drawn term
loan.  In this type, the full amount of the debt facility is extended, the
facility does not contain a revolving element that would permit the
borrower to repay and request new advances, and any commitment
period is ended.  Absent other complicating factors (such as whether
the SPV requires a license to lend to the debtor concerned), this type
of corporate loan asset is relatively simple to securitize.  At the other
end of the spectrum are corporate loan facilities that take the form of
committed, revolving lines of credit.  In these cases, the
unpredictability of the borrower’s funding requirements must be
accommodated within the SPV’s own funding structure.  If the SPV
assumes the commitment to lend, and then finds itself unable to do so
because it cannot access its own funding sources, it will be vulnerable
to suits for breach of contract and to lender liability suits.  On the
other hand, the SPV will not wish to issue debt immediately up to the
aggregate face amount of the committed lines of credit that it is
funding, because the unutilized portion of the debt that it has raised
(i.e., the portion retained to fund presently undrawn commitments)
will not be earning interest at a rate commensurate with the SPV’s
own funding costs.  Thus the structure will inevitably incur negative
carry.  This is a conundrum to which there is no definitive answer.
For the Originator, if the committed line of credit has a com-
mitment period of more than 365 days,34 that commitment will be a
risk-weighted off-balance sheet item.35  If the SPV agrees to assume
the commitment under a participation arrangement with the Origina-
34. Both the Basle Accord and the Solvency Ratio Directive risk weight undrawn com-
mitments with an original maturity of up to and including one year at zero percent, and un-
drawn commitments with an original maturity of more than one year at fifty percent.  See Basle
Accord, supra note 3, para. 42 and Annex 3; Solvency Ratio Directive, supra note 24, art. 6(2)
and Annex I.  However, the U.S. regulatory authorities differentiate between facilities with an
original maturity of 364 days or less, and those of 365 days or more.  This Article proceeds on
the assumption that the framework of the Basle Accord or the EC Directives will apply to the
risk-weighting of assets.
35. See, e.g., Basle Accord, supra note 3, Annex 3; Solvency Ratio Directive, supra note
24, arts. 6(2), 6(4) and 6(5).
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tor, but does not provide cash collateral for its funding obligation, the
Originator may be obliged (depending on its regulator’s interpreta-
tion of the Basle Accord) to assign a risk-weighting to the commit-
ment of the SPV, substituting this for the risk-weighting of the origi-
nal counterparty.  Because most SPVs are not banks or financial
institutions, claims on SPVs are ordinarily risk-weighted at one hun-
dred percent, as with any other corporate entity.36  This treatment
means that, in the absence of cash collateral for the SPV’s funding
obligation, the Originator will have the same capital/risk asset ratio
requirement in respect of its commitments to lend after the securiti-
zation as it had before.
At this point, a cost/benefit analysis must be conducted to de-
termine a number of things: the amount of committed lines of credit
present in a portfolio selected for securitization; the historical use of
those committed lines; and finally whether it makes more economic
sense to incur negative carry at the SPV level by cash collateralizing
this exposure, or to forego the better capital adequacy treatment that
the Originator would achieve if the committed but undrawn facilities
were fully transferred to (or cash collateralized by) the SPV.  Struc-
tures have now been developed, in part relying on U.S. master trust
credit card structures, that enable an SPV to issue variable tranches
of debt.  This permits the SPV to reduce and subsequently increase
the amount of its outstanding debt as assets pay down and are then
subsequently redrawn.  Although this type of structure provides
flexibility to the funding side of the equation, the Originator’s cost of
capital must still be considered if it is relying on a commitment to
fund provided by an SPV.
2.  Achieving Capital Release.  The method chosen to transfer
credit risk is an integral part of the transaction.  The rules applied by
bank regulatory authorities to determine whether a bank Originator
should be permitted to release capital formerly held against assets
transferred pursuant to a securitization transaction do not necessarily
follow accounting rules developed for determining whether assets
should be derecognized for the purpose of preparing accounts for
shareholders.  Thus bank regulatory authorities do not necessarily
treat the consequences of a transfer of risk in the way that lawyers or
auditors would.  For example, banks subject to the supervision of the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) in the United
36. See generally Basle Accord, supra note 3.
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States are required to account for the sale of financial assets in
accordance with U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP).  The previously applied Regulatory Accounting Principles
(RAPs) were discontinued in the first quarter of 1997, following the
adoption of Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) No. 125.37
However, the OCC Guidelines are still categoric in stating separate
rules for determining whether a sale of financial assets will be
effective to relieve a reporting institution from its capital
requirement associated with that asset.38  In general, no asset sale will
qualify for capital relief unless it complies with FAS 125;39 but an
asset sale, even if it complies with FAS 125, will not be treated as
derecognized for regulatory capital purposes unless it is clear that
(except for a very limited number of exceptions) the selling
institution has retained no recourse whatsoever in relation to the
assets transferred.40
To take another example, the accounting rules for the derecogni-
tion of the sale of financial assets by companies incorporated in the
United Kingdom are set out in Financial Reporting Standard (FRS)
5.41  FRS 5 specifies three different methods of accounting for sale:
37. See Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council Press Release, Nov. 3, 1995,
reprinted in 61 Fed. Reg. 48,687 (1996).
38. See OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC HANDBOOK ON ASSET
SECURITIZATION 59 (1997).
39. See FASB STATEMENT OF STANDARDS, Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Fi-
nancial Assets and Extinguishments of Liabilities, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards
No. 125, June 1996, at 7067.  Among the requirements necessary under FAS 125 to achieve sale
treatment is the delivery by counsel for the selling institution of an opinion letter stating that
the transfers constitute a sale of the underlying loans rather than a secured loan and, as such,
such loans would not constitute property of the selling institution’s estate for purposes of Sec-
tion 541 of the Bankruptcy Code, as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1983) [hereinafter
Bankruptcy Code].  Section 109 of the Bankruptcy Code exempts banks, including U.S.
branches of foreign banks, from the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.  Therefore, there may
be circumstances under which a sale opinion may not be necessary to achieve FAS 125 treat-
ment.  As more fully described below, the reported decisional authority is not conclusive as to
the relative weight to be accorded to various sale elements present in a transaction.  Further-
more, the results reached in certain cases addressing true sale matters may be inconsistent,
principally because the legal analysis is so dependent upon the facts and circumstances of a par-
ticular case.  Accordingly, opinions delivered under FAS 125 are typically reasoned opinions
that caution the recipient that the conclusions expressed therein are not predictions of what a
particular court would hold.
40. See generally OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 38.  FAS
125 permits a certain degree of recourse, without disqualifying the sale for accounting pur-
poses.
41. See U.K. FIN. REPORTING STANDARD 5 [hereinafter FRS 5] (on file with the Duke
Journal of Comparative & International Law).
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full derecognition of assets;42 linked presentation;43 and sales which re
not derecognized or delinked for accounting purposes, because the
selling institution retains too much recourse or involvement in the as-
sets.44  FRS 5 will apply to banks incorporated in the United King-
dom, inasmuch as it concerns the preparation of annual accounts re-
quired under U.K. company law legislation (principally, the
Companies Act of 198545).  The Bank of England, however, applies its
own rules to determine whether or not capital should be released.46
More often than not, if one looks at the statutory accounts prepared
by U.K. banks that have securitized their assets, one will find a linked
presentation for U.K. accounting purposes.47  This notwithstanding,
the Bank of England will permit those banks to release the capital
previously held against such securitized assets.
The different approaches taken by regulators and accountants or
auditors is borne of the different functions each undertakes.  Regula-
tors are concerned with the risk, primarily credit risk, associated with
loan assets.  Accountants and auditors, however, seek to identify not
only the risk associated with carrying assets but also the value of the
assets and the benefits associated with the assets.  They seek to en-
sure that the statutory accounts provide a true and fair view of the
42. In which case there will be no recourse available to the selling institution following the
transfer of the asset.
43. In which the selling institution has retained some recourse or some benefits in the
transferred assets, which will result in a requirement to report the entire transaction in gross
and net terms on its balance sheet.
44. See generally FRS 5, supra note 41.
45. See generally Companies Act, 1985 (Eng.).
46. See BANK OF ENGLAND NOTICES BSD/1989/1, BSD/1992/3 and S&S/1996/8.  Note that
in January 1998 the Bank of England’s Supervision and Surveillance Division issued a consulta-
tion document entitled Amendments to Policy on Loan Transfers and Securitization
[hereinafter the Consultation Document], which seeks to restate and clarify the Bank’s current
policy in relation to loan transfers and securitization (on file with the Duke Journal of Com-
parative & International Law).  The Notice to be issued by the Bank of England after comple-
tion of the consultation period will consolidate and amplify Notices BSD/1989/1, BSD/1992/3
(Part C of which has already been repealed by Notice S&S/1996/8) and S&S/1996/8.  The Con-
sultation Document contains more specific guidance on the regulator’s approach to the provi-
sion, and risk weighting, of credit enhancement and liquidity facilities provided to SPVs by
originating banks, and on specific issues arising from revolving purchase structures.  The Con-
sultation Document was sent to a relatively restricted group of recipients, principally to
authorized institutions under the U.K. Banking Act of 1987 who are already actively involved
in securitized products, either as originators or as the providers of third party credit enhance-
ment and liquidity facilities.  References in this Article to the Bank of England’s policies relat-
ing to securitization are to its existing policies published in Notices BSD/1989/1, BSD/1992/3
and S&S/1996/8, unless otherwise stated.
47. See generally FRS 5, supra note 41.
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overall financial condition of the owner of the assets.  Thus, retained
rights such as servicing revenue, swap fees or excess profit fees
should be represented within the statutory accounts; and the assets
giving rise to these revenues should be recognized.  For a bank regu-
lator, on the other hand, once credit risk has been removed from an
asset, there is no need to insist on the Originator bank holding capital
against a non-existent risk.48  The approach taken by the regulatory
authorities has permitted those who structure securitization transac-
tions to exercise more latitude in developing the legal structures, a
topic dealt with below.
3.  Moral Hazard.  One of the principal concerns of bank
regulators around the world who have examined securitization
structures is the question of moral hazard.  A bank may transfer the
credit risk associated with an asset, but will almost always retain
servicing rights and remain as the principal point of contact for
borrowers.  In most securitization structures, borrowers are not
aware that their loan has been transferred to an SPV; in some
structures, there is not even a true sale of the loan asset.
The regulators’ concern is that a bank will feel obliged to step in
and assume responsibility for an asset or customer relationship, not-
withstanding the transfer of risk achieved through the securitization.
This risk may arise in a number of different circumstances.  For in-
stance, a borrower may default and, in order to protect future cus-
tomer relationships, the Originator would repurchase the defaulted
asset, rather than leave the SPV to pursue its own remedies.  The
Originator will be aware that an SPV will have a relatively rigid
funding structure, and will be less able to exercise discretion in favor
of defaulting borrowers than the Originator.49  Alternatively, the
Originator may step in to protect investors in securities issued by the
SPV if default levels on the underlying assets prove to be higher than
expected.  An Originator would probably only undertake such ex-
treme measures if it was concerned that the SPV’s failure to meet its
liabilities would impact its own reputation.  Such action would, how-
ever, undermine the objectives of securitization.50
48. See generally Basle Accord, supra note 3.
49. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Structured Finance: The New Way to Securitize Assets, 11
CARDOZO L. REV. 607 (1990).
50. Reputation risk is one of a number of risks identified by the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency in the OCC BULLETIN ON SECURITIZATION, OCC 96-52, Sept. 25, 1996.  This
OCC Bulletin highlights the principal risks that originating banks which use securitization as a
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Bank regulators, including the OCC, the Bank of England and
the Dutch and German regulatory authorities, are all clear in their
insistence on ensuring that originating banks divorce themselves
completely from the securitization SPVs.51  Most regulatory authori-
ties will not permit originating banks to own any shares or other pro-
prietary or capital interests in such SPVs.52  Additionally, SPVs are
prohibited from having names that imply a relationship with the
Originator of the assets they purchase, and there are strict limits on
the type of facility an Originator may provide to an SPV.53  For ex-
ample, both the British and the German regulators restrict the types
of credit enhancement that may be provided by an Originator to sub-
ordinated debt subscribed for at the closing of the first issuance of se-
curities, as well as on terms that the debt cannot be redeemed until
all other debt in the structure has paid out.54
On the other hand, bank regulators and Originators will wish to
ensure that there is as little disruption as possible in the banker-
customer relationship.  The banker-customer relationship gives rise
funding strategy should identify and manage, including reputation risk, strategic risk (banks
should compare the strategic and financial objectives that securitization will achieve to the
various risk exposures and resource requirements inherent in this form of financing), credit risk
(which should be transferred, but because the performance of securitized portfolios is public
information, securitization has the potential to highlight problems previously hidden by overall
portfolio performance), transaction risk (servicer/originators should ensure that they under-
stand, and have the systems and internal controls necessary to cope with, securitization struc-
tures), liquidity risk and compliance risk.  See also BANK OF ENGLAND, NOTICE ON LOAN
TRANSFERS AND SECURITIZATION, BSD/1989/1, paras. 10-13, and the requirements specified
in para. 14; and BANK OF ENGLAND, SECURITIZATION OF REVOLVING CREDITS, S&S/1996/8,
which replaced Part C of Notice BSD/1992/3.
51. See BANK OF ENGLAND NOTICES, supra note 46.  See also BUNDESAUFSICHSAMPT
FÜR DAS KREDITWESEN, CIRCULAR LETTER 04/97, May 1997 [hereinafter BAK CIRCULAR];
DE NEDERLANDSCHE BANK, MEMORANDUM ON SECURITIZATION AND SUPERVISION, Sept.
25, 1997, paras. II.2 and IV.2, and app. 2 [hereinafter DNB MEMORANDUM].
52. See, e.g., BANK OF ENGLAND NOTICE BSD/1989/1, supra note 46, para. 14(ix); BAK
CIRCULAR, supra note 51, para. 7; DNB MEMORANDUM, supra note 51, app. 2, para. 7 under
the heading “Conditions to be Met by a Bank acting as Originator.”  Note that the DNB
Memorandum specifically provides for Dutch banks to incorporate SPV subsidiaries for the
purpose of undertaking securitization transactions: see paras. III.2.4 and IV.3 of the memoran-
dum.  Such a structure is likely to result, however, in the SPV subsidiary being included in the
parent bank’s consolidated capital return, and thus although capital may be released on a solo
accounts basis the parent credit institution will not achieve any release of capital at the consoli-
dated accounts level.
53. See, e.g., BANK OF ENGLAND NOTICE BSD/1989/1, supra note 46, para. 14(xi), (xii)
and (xiv); BAK CIRCULAR, supra note 51, art. I, paras. 5 and 7; DNB MEMORANDUM, supra
note 51, app. 2, paras. 8 and 10.
54. See BANK OF ENGLAND NOTICE BSD/1989/1, supra note 46, para. 14(xii).  See also
BAK CIRCULAR, supra note 51, art. I, para. 5.
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to unique legal issues, which are more fully addressed later in this Ar-
ticle.  Bank regulators will seek to ensure that any bank asset securi-
tization causes neither a breach of any of the bank’s legal duties to its
customer (such as the banker’s duty of confidentiality) nor any un-
reasonable disruption in the banker-customer relationship from a
commercial perspective.55
4.  Banker-Customer Relationship.  The banker-customer
relationship and the specter of moral hazard takes on particular
importance in the regulatory treatment of securitizations of
uncommitted lines of credit.56  On the one hand, it might be argued
that such facilities are relatively easy to securitize because undrawn
amounts under uncommitted lines of credit, and commitments with a
tenor of 365 days or less, have a credit conversion factor of zero
percent; thus they incur no capital cost.57  Once drawn, the resultant
loan asset will be risk-weighted at one hundred percent, as with other
corporate credits.  Since there is no capital cost so long as the facility
is undrawn, the structure does not have to address the complicated
funding and cash collateralization issues alluded to above.
Furthermore, because the facilities are uncommitted, or committed
only for short time periods, it is simple (theoretically) to terminate
the credit line or to wind down the commitment once the time comes
for the SPV to amortize and pay down its debt.
The reality is somewhat different, however, primarily because
the funding sources of an SPV are relatively rigid.  Although revolv-
ing assets are securitized, and revolving structures have been devel-
oped to permit an SPV to use collections on securitized assets to pur-
chase or fund additional assets or new drawings under existing assets,
these structures all eventually enter a wind-down or amortization pe-
riod.58  A bank will not wish to prejudice a corporate relationship by
permitting an SPV to make a demand under an overdraft facility
simply because the SPV needs to pay down its own debt.  As with
credit card facilities (which have no stated maturity), a bank Origina-
tor will wish to continue to fund these facilities.  Such additional
55. See e.g., BAK CIRCULAR, supra note 51, art. III.
56. Such as money market lines or overdraft facilities, as well as committed short-term
lines of credit that are habitually renewed.
57. See Basle Accord, supra note 3, para. 42(d) and Annex 3.  See also Solvency Ratio Di-
rective, supra note 24, Art. 6(2) and Annex I.
58. During this wind down period all collections are applied in the repayment of the SPV’s
debt, and cannot be used to fund new assets or existing assets in the portfolio.
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funding can come only through a new securitization of the asset in
question, or by the Originator reacquiring either the asset or the re-
sponsibility for funding the asset.  In a U.S. master trust structure, the
latter can be achieved by an increase in the seller interest in the trust.
An Originator may incur significant liquidity and capital ade-
quacy liabilities if large numbers of such assets start returning to its
balance sheet within a relatively short time period.59  In addition,
regulators have expressed their concern that the Originator not un-
wittingly provide credit enhancement to the SPV during any wind-
down period by an indiscriminate application of collections.  Thus, if
both the SPV and the Originator are funding a particular asset, in dif-
ferent proportions, incoming collections should be applied to the
Originator and the SPV in the appropriate proportion, rather than all
being paid first to the SPV until its interest is reduced to zero.60  This
requirement can result in complex systems necessary to trace the ap-
propriate allocations.
5.  Cherry Picking and Lemon Selling.  Regulators have voiced
concern that banks are securitizing their best assets, or to put it
another way, that they are cherry picking the portfolios identified for
securitization.  This will cause concern for a number of reasons.  The
minimum capital/risk asset ratio of eight percent, established by the
Basle Accord and the EC Directives on capital adequacy
requirements for credit and financial institutions, assumes a
diversification of assets within a bank’s overall portfolio.  This is
based upon four elements: industry diversification; diversification by
the country of the borrower; diversification by economic sectors; and
diversification in the types of borrower and credit facility.  Without
this diversification, it must be assumed that the minimum eight
percent requirement would be significantly higher.
On the other hand, neither the Basle Accord nor the EC Direc-
tives apply any type of methodology to measure the credit risk asso-
ciated with a corporate loan asset, other than to assume the worst and
apply a one hundred percent risk-weighting to all such assets.  Not-
withstanding the simplistic approach to risk-weighting, some regula-
tory authorities (such as the German supervisory authority) have in-
dicated in their guidelines for securitization that banks must choose
59. See generally Basle Accord, supra note 3.
60. See, e.g., OCC BULLETIN 96-52, supra note 50.  See also BANK OF ENGLAND NOTICE
S&S/1996/8, supra note 46.
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assets for securitization on a random basis.  Furthermore, if the re-
maining assets show a material deterioration in credit quality from
the bank’s asset profile pre-securitization, a bank may be subject to
“exceptional circumstances” under the German regulatory rules
(which gives the regulator a right to deviate from the general eight
percent capital/risk asset ratio requirement).61  Additionally, the audi-
tors of German banks are required to indicate in their annual report
to the regulators whether the remaining asset portfolio of a bank has
deteriorated “as a consequence of any asset backed security (ABS)
transaction.”62  This in itself is a difficult issue for any auditor to
gauge, not least because the credit quality of a bank’s remaining as-
sets may deteriorate for reasons wholly unconnected with securitiza-
tion, and the credit quality of the securitized assets themselves may
decline post-securitization as a result of changes in both macro- and
micro-economic conditions.  Nor is it entirely clear how credit quality
is to be determined for these purposes:  Is a bank supposed to weight
its asset portfolio on the basis of its own internal credit-scoring meth-
odology, or is it supposed to track only defaults on remaining assets
and compare these defaults to historical data?
The approach taken on the issue of cherry picking and its corol-
lary, lemon selling (whereby the Originator deliberately sells non-
performing or less credit-worthy assets), by regulators with more ex-
perience of securitization is less formalistic.  Neither the Bank of
England nor the OCC impose strict limitations or restrictions on the
selection of assets for inclusion within a securitization portfolio.63  To
the extent that certain asset types are homogenous, such as credit
card receivables, assets should generally be chosen at random from
within a bank’s overall portfolio.64  Corporate loan assets, however,
61. See BAK CIRCULAR, supra note 51, art. II.
62. See id. art. IV.
63. See e.g., Federal Reserve System, Supervision and Regulation, Task Force on Securiti-
zation, AN INTRODUCTION TO ASSET SECURITIZATION (1990).  See also BANK OF ENGLAND
NOTICE S&S/1996/8, supra note 45.
64. See, e.g., BANK OF ENGLAND NOTICE S&S/1996/8, supra note 46, para. 11.  Random
selection of assets such as credit card receivables is required in this instance to ensure that,
among other things, there is no systematic selection of higher quality assets for inclusion in the
securitization pool, to the benefit of the investor interest in the pool and the relative detriment
of the Originator’s seller interest.  However, securitization pools of credit card receivables gen-
erally comprise thousands of credit card accounts, each giving rise to receivables of a relatively
small amount, originated in accordance with standard credit underwriting procedures and stan-
dard documentation.  It should be relatively simple to select assets bearing such homogenous
characteristics on a random basis.  See also Consultation Document, supra note 46, sec. 5, para.
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are far from homogenous; corporate borrowers have credit profiles
that differ markedly from each other, depending on the structure of
their capital base, the markets in which they operate, their gearing
(or ratio of debt to equity), the jurisdiction in which they are incorpo-
rated, and other factors.65  Furthermore, loan documentation is likely
to have been the subject of negotiation.  It is far more likely that in-
dividual and extensive credit assessments have been carried out on
corporate borrowers than on consumers applying for volume prod-
ucts such as mortgage loans or credit cards; thus it is easier to identify
the best and the worst credits and to produce a more systematic
evaluation of the Originator’s own credit-underwriting systems.66
The best corporate credits (in terms of risk profile) may be ex-
cluded in any event from a securitization portfolio because their high
credit-worthiness is reflected in a low interest rate that falls below the
threshold rate that the SPV requires in order to meet its own funding
costs.  However, the regulatory authorities in the United States and
the United Kingdom generally recognize that, at least initially, banks
will seek to identify good assets for their securitization programs,
since they want to ensure their ability to access the capital markets.
If their securitized assets fail to perform as expected, investors will
shy away from asset-backed securities originated by them.  This in it-
self is perceived by the regulators to be an incentive to originating
banks to ensure that standards of origination and credit underwriting
do not decline once banks begin to securitize their assets.67
Regulators in both the United States and United Kingdom also
recognize that if banks retain only those assets that do not perform
well, this approach will rebound on them in at least three ways.  First,
5.2.3, which addresses issues arising from asset replenishment in a securitization structure.  Two
of the criteria listed as required to be satisfied if additional assets are added to a securitization
are (a) that the asset quality of the pool is not materially altered by the addition of further
tranches of assets to the securitization pool, and (b) that any change to the quality of the assets
remaining with the originating bank is either not material or is acceptable to the Bank of Eng-
land.  The test of material alteration of the quality of the asset pool is to be applied to the qual-
ity of the asset pool at the time of the proposed addition of assets, not the quality of the pool at
the time of the original securitization, thus preventing originating banks from shoring up the
quality of securitized assets of deteriorating credit quality with the addition of new, better
quality assets.  As discussed in the text above, the Bank of England may use its general supervi-
sory powers to discourage banks from securitizing only their best assets.  See also Consultation
Document, supra note 46, sec. 3, para. 3.5, regarding the implications of a securitization on the
profile of a bank’s remaining assets, in terms of both quality and spread.
65. See Basle Accord, supra note 3, sec. 1.
66. See id.
67. See OCC BULLETIN 96-52, supra note 50.
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the Originator’s capital/risk asset ratio requirement is likely to be
raised, in line with the perceived increase in credit risk with respect
to the remaining assets and other risks incidental to a securitization
program.68  Second, if assets start to default, the Originator will have
to set aside specific provisions; unlike general provisions, specific
provisions do not count as Tier 1 capital.  The result will be that a
bank’s qualifying capital will fall at the same time as its capital/risk
asset ratio requirement is rising, which would be counter-productive
for any bank engaging in securitization.  Third, the retention of
poorly-performing assets is likely to have an impact on a bank’s
overall profitability, as earnings will be reduced.69
6.  Liquidity Facilities and Large Exposures.  As mentioned
above, in order to address both credit concerns and concerns
regarding moral hazard, the types of credit enhancement that a bank
Originator may provide to an SPV acquiring assets that it has
originated are generally very limited.  Pure credit enhancement
provided to an SPV by a bank originator is required to be deducted
on a one-for-one basis from the total qualifying Tier 1 and Tier 2
capital.70  On the other hand, interest rate and foreign exchange
contracts may generally be entered into between a bank originator
and an SPV to which the bank has sold loan assets, provided that the
swap contracts are concluded at arm’s length and at market prices.71
Some corporate loan securitization structures rely, in addition,
on the provision of liquidity facilities to the SPV, particularly in con-
nection with variable funding arrangements extended to the SPV.
Different regulatory authorities have taken different approaches to
formulating policies relating to the provision of liquidity facilities to
SPVs.  The Bank of England, for example, prohibits Originators from
providing liquidity facilities to SPVs that have previously purchased
their assets.72  Banks authorized by the Bank of England may, how-
68. See, e.g., Consultation Document, supra note 46, sec. 3, para.3.3, regarding the impact
of operational risks on the setting of a bank’s trigger capital ratio.
69. See id. para. 3.5.
70. See, e.g., BANK OF ENGLAND NOTICE BSD/1989/1, supra note 46, para. 14(xii); BAK
CIRCULAR, supra note 46, art. I, para. 5, and DNB MEMORANDUM, supra note 46, app. 2.
71. See, e.g., BANK OF ENGLAND NOTICE BSD/1989/1, supra note 46, para. 14 (xiii), and
DNB MEMORANDUM, supra note 46 app. 2.
72. See BANK OF ENGLAND NOTICE BSD/1989/1, supra note 46, para. 14 and the clarifying
statements in the Consultation Document, supra note 46, sec. 6.3.3, stating that an “originator
or servicing agent may not provide a liquidity facility as it is deemed to be funding.  If it does, it
is deemed not to have achieved a clean break with the assets, which will then be taken on its
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ever, provide liquidity facilities to securitization SPVs which pur-
chase assets originated by third party banks.  The Dutch Central
Bank, on the other hand, does not in practice prohibit the provision
of liquidity facilities by originator banks.73  Such liquidity facilities
may be acceptable to U.S. regulators, but the analysis is heavily de-
pendent upon the particular facts and circumstances relating to the
individual SPV.
Liquidity facilities, particularly those granted in support of
commercial paper (CP) programs, are generally provided in the form
of a committed line of credit with a tenor of 364 days or less,74 and are
risk-weighted at zero percent.  However, this risk-weighting assumes
that the providers of the facility are not providing de facto credit en-
hancement.75  Thus any liquidity facility must be true liquidity and not
trick liquidity,76 and as such should cover only short term funding
needs, and not bear any of the credit risk associated with the non-
performance of the underlying assets.  Banks providing such facilities
should ensure that the facilities granted do not breach other regula-
tory requirements, such as large exposure limits on single counterpar-
ties.  For example, a number of bank Originators have securitized
their loan assets by selling participations or assignments to SPVs,
which have then raised debt by issuing commercial paper (thus arbi-
traging between the interest rate payable on short term CP and the
interest earned on longer-dated assets).  In order to protect the hold-
balance sheet.”  There is an exception for provisions of liquidity facilities to cover very short
timing differences.
73. See DNB MEMORANDUM, supra note 46, app. 2, which contains no express prohibition
against the provision of liquidity.
74. See Basle Accord, supra note 3, Annex 3, and the Solvency Ratio Directive, supra note
24, art. 6(2) and Annex I.  Off-balance sheet commitments which, in fact, operate as direct
credit substitutes are required to be assigned a credit conversion factor of one hundred percent.
75. See id.
76. The availability of liquidity facilities provided in connection with the issuance of com-
mercial paper by an SPV is determined by reference to an SPV’s borrowing base.  The bor-
rowing base should represent the aggregate amount of performing (non-defaulted) assets in the
SPV’s receivables portfolio at the time the facility is drawn.  The restriction on the availability
of funds is intended to ensure that banks providing liquidity are not also assuming credit risk on
the portfolio, hence they will lend only up to the amount that will ultimately be received by the
SPV as the performing assets pay out.  Liquidity facilities which in fact import credit risk on the
liquidity banks are referred to as trick liquidity, and should carry a higher credit conversion
factor for risk asset weighting purposes than true liquidity, because they operate, in effect, as
direct credit substitutes.  Trick liquidity is usually achieved by adjusting the dates at which re-
ceivables are deemed to have become delinquent, defaulted or written off (and thus excluded
from the definition of borrowing base) to dates which fall a relatively long period after the con-
tractual due date for payment on the receivables.
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ers of the CP, and to protect the SPV generally from this structural
mismatch between the tenors of its assets and liabilities, standby li-
quidity facilities are provided to the SPV.  Such facilities must be, in
an aggregate amount, at least equal to the aggregate amount of CP in
issuance, plus a small amount to cover accrued interest or accreted
discount.  In the past couple of years, billions of dollars of CP have
been issued in this manner, backed by corporate loan assets.  This
must mean that banks have booked billions of dollars of liquidity
commitments.
Although liquidity facilities are usually granted for a period of
364 days or fewer, to avoid a capital charge on the commitment, the
large exposure rules will still apply to these commitments.  A bank
incorporated in a member state of the European Union, for instance,
should not incur an exposure of greater than ten percent of its quali-
fying (Tier 1 plus Tier 2 ) capital base to any counterparty or group of
connected counterparties.77  The sheer size of the liquidity facilities
backing CP issuance will require either that liquidity facilities be syn-
dicated, or alternatively, that banks providing liquidity facilities per-
suade their regulators that they should be permitted to look through
the SPV to the underlying corporate credits when dealing with large
exposures.  If the latter approach is taken, the Originator’s reporting
and risk management systems would have to be amended to ensure
that they encapsulate the underlying corporate risks.  However, it is
unlikely that such an approach would be agreed upon.  Third party
liquidity providers are unlikely to know the identity of the borrowers
included in the securitized pool.78
7.  Which Regulator?  By which supervisory rules is the
Originator bound?  This is a question that arises in all cross-border
securitizations of bank assets.  Within the European Union, the
answer is relatively simple when dealing with credit institutions
incorporated in a member state.  The principles of harmonization of
minimum regulatory requirements, recognition of supervisory
standards, and the concept of home country supervision, mean that a
bank incorporated in any member state of the EU need be concerned
only with the regulatory and supervisory standards of its home
supervisory authority.79  Host member states, in which the credit
77. See Council Directive 92/121/EEC, 1992 O.J. (L 29) 1.
78. See discussion infra Part III.
79. See Council Directive 89/646/EEC, 1989 O.J. (L 386) 1, art. 14 and tit. V.
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institution may have branches, or may offer cross-border services,
generally have very little authority over credit institutions
incorporated elsewhere in the EU.  They do, however, retain the
responsibility, in cooperation with the supervisory authority in the
home member state, for the supervision of the liquidity of local
branches within their territory.80  This right could be important in the
context of a securitization.
Elsewhere in the world, regulators may take markedly different
approaches.  In general, a bank Originator will always have to comply
with the regulatory and accounting requirements established by its
jurisdiction of incorporation.  Some jurisdictions will also allow
branches of foreign banks to apply the rules of their home jurisdic-
tion to determine whether or not capital release is obtained.81  Others
insist that local rules must be satisfied in addition to the rules of the
home jurisdiction.82  Compliance with local rules on bank secrecy and
banker-customer relationships is also typically required.  In the
United States, foreign banks that do not take deposits within the
United States, and which are not, therefore, subject to oversight by
the FDIC, may generally apply the rules of their home jurisdiction.83
In addition to the requirements of local regulators, the legal ad-
visors to any transaction involving the securitization of corporate
loans originated by branches of a bank situated outside its jurisdic-
tion of incorporation must consider the impact of bankruptcy or in-
solvency laws in two jurisdictions: that in which the branches are lo-
cated, and the bank’s jurisdiction of incorporation.84
III.  SALES OF LOAN ASSETS
There are three methods by which a loan asset may be “sold” to
achieve release of regulatory capital.  The three methods are nova-
tion, assignment and participation.  Each of these three methods is
briefly described below.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See e.g., 12 C.F.R. pt. 28; 12 C.F.R. pt. 211.
84. The analysis of the impact of cross-border insolvency laws is beyond the scope of this
Article, but a good understanding of the issues concerned is imperative to structuring a success-
ful CLO transaction.  For a comprehensive analysis on this subject, see 6A NORTON BANKR. L.
& PRAC. 2d §152 (1998).
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A.  Novation
Novation is the “cleanest” method of transfer of a loan asset
and—under English law at least—it is the only means by which obli-
gations may be transferred.  In the context of loan securitization, no-
vation is the only sure method to transfer an ongoing commitment.85
In this context, a novation involves a tripartite arrangement whereby
the two parties to an original contract, the Originator and the debtor,
agree with a SPV that the SPV shall become a substitute for the
Originator, and thus assume the Originator’s rights and obligations
under the original contract.86  This substitution process results in the
termination of the original contract, and in the creation of a new con-
tract between the SPV and the debtor.  It is imperative, therefore,
that the debtor consents to any such arrangement, and that there is
adequate consideration for the new contract between the SPV and
the debtor.87
While from a legal perspective novation represents the cleanest
form of transfer, there are a number of legal and practical reasons
why novation is rarely used in securitization transactions.  First,
banks generally do not want their customers to know that they are
securitizing their assets.  A requirement to obtain the customer’s con-
sent to the transfer would defeat this objective; many customers are
likely to object in any event—particularly those with ongoing funding
requirements and concerns about the SPV’s ability to fund such re-
quirements in a timely manner.  Second, if the loan asset is secured
by collateral, the novation terminates the original security interest,
which must be replaced by a new security interest.  The result would
be the same if the facility was guaranteed because a novation extin-
guishes the original contract between the Originator and the debtor
and replaces it with a new contract between the SPV and the debtor.
Since a novation extinguishes the original contract, it must also ipso
facto extinguish any security or guarantee for that security.  As a re-
sult, it may be necessary to make additional filings to perfect the new
security interest.88  In addition, avoidance periods will start to run
again.89  If the avoidance periods do start to run again, the asset or se-
85. See NOTICE BSD/1989/1, supra note 46 & Annex.
86. See, e.g., The Aktion [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 283, 310-311(Q.B).  On the issue of consid-
eration, see Tatlock v. Harris, 100 Eng. Rep. 517, 520 (K.B. 1789).
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., U.C.C. Art. 9 (1994); Companies Act, 1985, ch. 6 § 395 (Eng.)
89. See, e.g., Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45 §§ 238-245 (Eng.); 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1994).
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curity for the asset may become vulnerable to challenge if the debtor
becomes subject to bankruptcy or other insolvency proceedings.
B.  Assignment
Under English law, there are two methods by which a debt or
other chose in action may be assigned: legal assignment and equitable
assignment.90  A legal assignment is an assignment that satisfies the
criteria of Section 136 of the 1925 Law of Property Act, namely that
the assignment (i) is an absolute assignment (i.e., not purported to be
by way of charge only), (ii) is in writing, (iii) is of the whole of the
debt,91 and (iv) is notified expressly in writing to the underlying
debtor.92  Any assignment that does not satisfy all four criteria of Sec-
tion 136 will generally be given effect as an equitable assignment.93
An assignment, whether legal or equitable, operates under Eng-
lish law to transfer a proprietary interest in the asset in question.  A
legal assignment operates from the date on which notice is given to
the underlying debtor to transfer: 1) the legal right to the debt; 2) the
90. Contractual rights, being choses in action as opposed to things in possession, were not
assignable at common law without the consent of both parties to the original contract.  The
courts of equity, however, did give effect to assignments of choses in action.  Perhaps the most
significant feature of the division between the English courts of law (i.e., common law) and eq-
uity was the almost complete refusal by the courts of law to recognize that equitable rights, ti-
tles and interests entitled their holders to any relief at law.  Each system, law or equity, devised
its own procedural rules and remedies, resulting in substantive differences in the approaches of
the two jurisdictions.  For a discussion of the history of the divisions between and subsequent
fusion of the courts of common law and equity, see R.P. MEAGHER ET AL., EQUITY: DOC-
TRINES AND REMEDIES 36-41 (3d ed. 1992).  Section 16 of the Judicature Act of 1873 fused the
administration of law and equity, and brought both within the jurisdiction of the new High
Court of Justice.  In addition, and pertinent to this Article, general statutory provision was
made for the first time, by Section 25(6) of the Judicature Act, for the assignment of choses in
action.  See id.  Section 25(6) of the 1873 Act was repealed, and was substantially re-enacted by
the provisions of section 136 of the 1925 Law of Property Act.  See Law of Property Act, 1925,
15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 20, § 136 (Eng.).  Thus, “legal assignments” are also frequently referred to
as “statutory assignments,” in recognition of the fact that under the common law it was not pos-
sible to assign a chose in action without obtaining consent, and the void created by the common
law was required to be filled by express statutory provision.
91. The requirement that a statutory assignment be an assignment of the whole debt or
chose in action in question is an aspect of the requirement under section 136 of the 1925 Law of
Property Act that the assignment be “absolute.”  See, e.g., Jones v. Humphrey [1902] 1 K.B. 10
(1901); Forster v. Baker [1910] 2 K.B. 636 (C.A.); In re Steel Wing Co., Ltd. [1921] 1 Ch. 349
(1920); Walter and Sullivan Ltd. v. Murphy & Sons Ltd. [1955] 2 Q.B. 584 (C.A.).
92. See Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 20, § 136 (Eng.).
93. Difficult, and as yet unresolved, issues may arise as to whether consideration is neces-
sary for the effectiveness of an equitable assignment.  However, these issues are beyond the
scope of this Article.
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legal and other remedies for the same; and 3) the power for the as-
signee to give a good discharge for the debt without the concurrence
of the assignor.94  An equitable assignment, however, will operate to
transfer only the beneficial interest in the asset, and legal title will
remain with the assignor.95  A transfer pursuant to an equitable as-
signment results in some procedural inconvenience, because under
English law and rules of procedure the holder of the equitable title
generally may not sue on the asset.96  Instead, the holder of the equi-
table title must join the owner of the legal title.97  Joining the owner
of the legal title may be done with the owner’s consent, in which case
the owner will be joined as a co-plaintiff to the proceedings; however,
it may also be done without the owner’s consent, in which case the
owner is joined as a co-defendant.98
An assignment under English law operates only to transfer rights
in assets; it is not possible to “assign” obligations without obtaining
the consent of the debtor99—notwithstanding the frequency with
which this rule is misunderstood.100  In the context of a corporate
loans securitization, therefore, only the rights under existing loan as-
sets are capable of assignment; obligations to fund undrawn commit-
ments cannot be “assigned” and must be transferred by another
means.  To date, such commitments have been transferred under par-
ticipation structures rather than by novation.
When loan asset assignments are structured under English law,
the method of assignment used will be equitable assignment.  An eq-
uitable assignment is used principally because the Originator will not
want its customers to be aware of the securitization of their assets.
Banks that have a significant connection with the United Kingdom
94. See Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 20, § 136 (Eng.).
95. See, e.g., Holroyd v. Marshall, 11 Eng. Rep. 999 (H.L. 1862); Tailby v. Official Re-
ceiver, 13 App. Cas. 523 (1888) (appeal taken from Eng.).  As to the capacity in which the as-
signor holds the legal title, see for example, Howard v. Miller, 1915 App. Cas. 318 (P.C. 1914)
(appeal taken from Can.).
96. See Durham Bros. v. Robertson [1898] 1 Q.B. 765 (C.A.).  But see William Brandt’s
Sons & Co. v. Dunlop Rubber Co., Ltd., 1905 App.Cas. 454 (appeal taken from Eng.).  See also
The Aiolos [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 25, 33-34 (C.A.).
97. See cases cited supra note 96.
98. See id.  See also R. SUP. CT, Order 15, r. 6.
99. Thereby effecting a novation.
100. See Tolhurst v. Associated Portland Cement Mfrs. (1900) Ltd. [1902] 2 K.B. 660
(C.A.).  In particular, note the speech of Lord Collins, M.R.  See id. at 668 (“Neither at law nor
in equity could the burden of a contract be shifted off the shoulders of a contractor on to those
of another without the consent of the contractee.”).
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will avoid legal assignments for another reason: documents evidenc-
ing the conveyance of choses in action are stampable at an ad valo-
rem rate under the Stamp Act of 1891 unless the documents fall
within a statutory exemption.101  Since a legal assignment must be evi-
denced by a document, such a document will almost always be stam-
pable if brought into the United Kingdom.  In addition, the language
of any notice of an assignment that is sent to debtors must be care-
fully drafted.  The notice may itself constitute written evidence of the
transfer of a proprietary interest, and thus be a stampable instru-
ment.102  If the underlying debtors are not informed of the transfer of
the assets in question, the securitization structure will carry addi-
tional legal risks.  These risks tend to be prevalent in all common and
civil law jurisdictions.  An example of such a risk is that as long as
debtors have not received a notice of the assignment, debtors may
continue to pay the Originator, and receive a good discharge of their
debt.103  So, if a debtor pays an Originator which becomes insolvent
immediately after receiving the payment and prior to paying the
SPV, the SPV will have no recourse against the debtor.104  The SPV
must then either claim that the Originator received the payment in
trust for the SPV,105 or it must claim against the Originator’s estate, in
common with other creditors.106  There are also risks regarding pro-
prietary interests.  As previously indicated, an assignment should op-
erate to transfer a proprietary right in the debt and the proceeds of
the debt.  This proprietary right may be lost, however, if the SPV
permits the Originator to commingle the proceeds of the SPV’s assets
with its own assets or to treat the SPV’s cash as fungible with its own.
In such cases, a debtor-creditor relationship is likely to arise between
101. See English, Scottish and Australian Bank Ltd. v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue,
1932 App. Cas. 238. (1931) (appeal taken from Eng.).
102. An instrument that is stampable under the Stamp Act, and which has not been
stamped with the appropriate duty, is inadmissible in evidence in any English civil court pro-
ceeding. See Stamp Act, 1891, 54 & 55 Vict., ch. 39, § 14(4) (Eng.). However, the failure to
stamp a stampable instrument does not have any effect on the validity of the instrument as be-
tween the parties thereto.
103. See Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 20, § 136 (Eng.). For equitable as-
signments, see Stocks v. Dobson, 43 Eng. Rep. 411 (Ch. App. 1853).
104. See sources cited supra note 103.
105. Applicable to those jurisdictions that recognize the concept of trust, and thus trace its
entitlement outside the Originator’s bankruptcy estate. This may be futile if the money was
paid into an overdrawn account.
106. This would occur if the SPV is unable to establish a proprietary right to the payment
received, or to trace its proprietary interest in the payment into the hands of the Originator.
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the Originator and the SPV, but the SPV’s proprietary interest in
particular payments will be lost.
In addition, the failure to notify the borrower of the assignment
may permit the borrower to set off claims that it has against the
Originator against obligations it owes to the Originator.  Under Eng-
lish law, an assignee (legal or equitable) takes “subject to equities,”
which means that the assignee should be in no better position vis-a-
vis the debtor than the assignor was prior to the assignment.107  Once
the assignee notifies the borrower of the assignments, any future right
to set-off will be lost.  The future right of set-off will be lost in this
situation because under English law once notice of assignment has
been given the debtor cannot do anything to take away or diminish
the rights of the assignee as they stood at the time of the notice.108
However, set-off rights will continue to exist and be binding on the
assignee to the extent that they arise out of the same contract which
gives rise to the loan asset.109
Set-off rights are fundamentally important to securitizations by
banks for two reasons.  First, because banks are deposit-taking insti-
tutions, some corporate borrowers will also maintain deposit or
trading accounts with their lenders, and will therefore be entitled to
set off their deposits against their debt obligations to the bank.110
Once the assignee has given notice to the debtor of his interest in a
loan—or in the context of U.S. law, once contractual privity is estab-
lished between the borrower and the SPV—the borrower will lose
107. See, e.g., Dawson v. Great Northern & City Railway Co. [1905] 1 K.B. 260 (C.A. 1904).
See also In re Harry Simpson & Co. and The Companies Act 1936, 1964 N.S.W.R. 603, 605
(Jacobs J., dictum), which is a decision of a New South Wales court, but nonetheless applies in
this case the long-standing principles of equity as developed by the English courts.
108. See Roxburghe v. Cox, 17 Ch. D. 520, 526 (C.A. 1881).  A set-off claim under U.S. law
is comprised of three elements: (i) a contractual relationship, (ii) mutuality of the parties (e.g.,
the set-off and the cause of action are between the same parties and in the same capacity or
right) and (iii) due and owing obligations. See 20 AM. JUR. 2D Setoff or Compensation § 6
(1995). As for mutuality of the parties, as one court has noted, set-off “is permissible where
mutual debts and credits exist.  [F]or debts and credits to be mutual [they] must be due from
the same persons in the same capacity. They cannot be liabilities held in inconsistent relations.”
Diesel Motors Co. v. Kaye (In re Diesel Motors Co.), 345 N.Y.S.2d 870, 875 (N.Y. Nassau
County Ct. 1973).
109. See Business Computers Ltd v. Anglo-African Leasing Ltd. [1977] 1 W.L.R. 578 (Ch.).
The latter point is generally more relevant to securitizations involving the sale of goods, in
which case it is not possible to deprive a debtor of his right to set-off damages for breach of
contract, for example, as a result of the failure to deliver goods of the appropriate quality or
type from the purchase price payable for the goods.
110. See sources cited supra note 108.
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any future right to set off deposits but will retain any rights or equi-
ties accrued up to the date on which he received notice.111  The set-off
right itself may be diluted if the deposits or the loan assets turn over
and are replaced with new deposits and loan assets.112 Second, if a
bank has extended a loan commitment to the borrower and if the
bank fails to honor that commitment, any damages that the borrower
incurs as a result of such failure may be set-off against the borrower’s
loan obligation.113
Under U.S. law, if the “transfer” from the bank to the SPV es-
tablishes contractual privity between the borrower and the SPV, set-
off is not permissible because the damages claim is unrelated to an
act or omission of the SPV.  If the “transfer” merely establishes con-
tractual privity between the bank and the SPV, however, then the
mutuality requirement for set-off is satisfied because the bank both
owns the loan obligation and is contractually committed to the bor-
rower to make new loans.  It is rare for a solvent bank to breach valid
loan commitments, however, so this set-off concern arises principally
when considering the impact of bank insolvency proceedings upon
the credit strength of the securitization structure.  In addition, there
may be other limitations on the borrower’s ability to assert a set-
off.114  Although the SPV will have a contractual claim against the
111. See id.
112. See, e.g., Devaynes v. Noble, Clayton’s Case, 35  Eng. Rep. 767, 781 (Ch. 1816); Deely
v. Lloyds Bank, Ltd., 1912 App. Cas. 756 (appeal taken from Eng.).
113. Under English law, it is clear that if a claim for unliquidated damages can be set off
against an assignor, it can also be set off against the assignee if it arises out of the transaction
giving rise to the assigned debt.  See Government of Newfoundland v. Newfoundland Ry. Co.,
13 App. Cas. 199 (P.C. 1888) (appeal taken from Can.).
114. Under U.S. law, a receiver appointed for an insolvent bank may repudiate the Bank’s
contractual obligation to make future loans. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(1) (1994).  The borrower is
entitled to a claim against the Bank’s receiver for “actual direct compensatory damages.” Id. at
§ 1821(e)(3)(A)(i).  In assessing any damages related to the repudiation, however, the statute
provides that only actual direct compensatory damages may be awarded and that such damages
are determined “as of the date of the appointment of the conservator or receiver.” Id. at §
1821(e)(3)(A)(ii)(I).  “Punitive or exemplary damages, damages for lost profits or opportunity
or damages for pain and suffering” are exempted from recovery. Id. at § 1821(B)(i)-(iii).  One
court has found that, in its capacity as receiver of a failed institution, the FDIC’s repudiation of
a borrower’s line of credit gave rise to damages related to lost profits or lost opportunities, not
actual direct compensatory damages.  See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Cobblestone Corp., 1992
WL 333961, at *3-*5 (D. Mass. Oct. 28, 1992) (finding a borrower’s payments due on drawn
funds impermissible because the borrower failed to demonstrate that there was any “value” to
the credit line on the date of the FDIC’s repudiation given that the originating institution was
“insolvent and facing possible liquidation” and holding that repudiation of such line of credit
amounted only to “lost profits and opportunities for which Congress expressly precluded re-
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Originator for reimbursement of any loan obligation amounts subject
to a set-off under most set-off scenarios, securitization structures in-
volving corporate loan assets typically require reserve mechanisms to
protect the SPV from the effects of a set-off.  These reserve mecha-
nisms are designed to reduce the credit exposure that the SPV incurs
with respect to the Originator.
The legal consequences of an assignment in breach of a contrac-
tual prohibition on assignment will vary according to the proper law
of the contract under which the asset assigned comes into being.  Un-
der English law, for example, if there is a prohibition on assignment
in the underlying contract, any purported assignment will be ineffec-
tive to vest any contractual rights in the assignee.115  While the House
of Lords stated in Linden Garden Trust Ltd. v. Lenesta Sludge Dis-
posal Ltd. that a purported assignment in breach of a prohibition on
assignment is ineffective to transfer contractual rights, it also stated
that
a prohibition on assignment normally only invalidates the assign-
ment as against the other party to the [underlying] contract . . . in
the absence of the clearest words, it cannot operate to invalidate
the contract as between the assignor and the assignee, and even
then may be ineffective on the grounds of public policy.116
The assignee may attempt to acquire an assignment of the proceeds
of the contractual right, which would constitute a different proprie-
tary interest outside the underlying contract.  Such an assignment
would not give the assignee any direct rights against the borrower,
but would be effective to remove the proceeds from the assignor’s es-
tate should it become insolvent.117
The legal consequences in the United States of an assignment
that violates an anti-assignment provision in a contract varies from
state to state.  Under other legal systems, the assignment may be ef-
fective as between assignor and assignee, but not as between the as-
covery under FIRREA”; however, the court refused to determine whether a “claimant who has
sustained actual damage has a common law right of set off”). But see Nashville Lodging Co. v.
Resolution Trust Corp., 59 F.3d 236, 245 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (sanctioning, in dicta, damages claims
for a receiver’s repudiation of a promised loan premised in both the borrower’s expectation
interest (e.g., “the value of the expectancy which the [breached] promise created”) and the bor-
rower’s “reliance interest” (e.g., restoring the borrower to the position it was in before the bro-
ken promise was made).
115. See Linden Garden Trusts, Ltd. v. Lenesta Sludge Disposals, Ltd. [1994] 1 App. Cas.
85, 98-117 (1993)(appeal taken from Eng.) (speech of Lord Browne-Wilkinson).
116. See id.
117. See id.
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signee and the underlying debtor.  These different legal consequences
require a careful review of the assignment provisions of each loan
agreement prior to finalizing the securitization structure.  Because of
the expense associated with this due diligence—as well as the other
limitations of an assignment structure as discussed above—most se-
curitization transactions involving corporate loans have used a par-
ticipation structure to transfer interest in the loans to the SPV.
Under U.S. law, it is generally recognized that the right to re-
ceive monies due or to become due under an existing contract may be
assigned.118 . This right may be limited where such assignment is pro-
hibited by statute,119 where such assignment is contrary to public pol-
icy,120 or where the contract expressly provides that the right is not as-
signable.121  Courts examining the enforceability of contractual
language which prohibits assignment generally distinguish between
cases involving assignors and assignees, and those involving assignors
and obligors.122  Numerous cases support the proposition that the as-
signee can maintain an action to enforce the assignment as against
the assignor even in the presence of a contractual provision that pre-
cludes assignment.123   .The assignor may be liable, however, for dam-
ages from a breach of such contractual provision.124
The majority of jurisdictions in the United States have adopted
the “American rule,” which provides that notice to an obligor of a
118. See, e.g., Martin v. Barclays Amer./Leasing, Inc., (In re Martin), 117 B.R. 243, 249-50
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990); Village of Westville v. Loitz Bros. Constr. Co., Inc., 519 N.E. 2d 37
(Ill. App. 4th Dist. 1988); Miller v. Wells Fargo Bank Int’l Corp., 406 F. Supp. 452 (S.D.N.Y.
1975), aff’d., 540 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1976); Continental Oil Co. v. U.S., 326 F. Supp. 266
(S.D.N.Y. 1971).  See generally III  E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS
§11.2 (1990).
119. See Martin v. Barclays Amer./Leasing, Inc., (In re Martin), 117 B.R. 243, 249-50
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990).
120. See id.
121. See, e.g., Hurst v. West, 272 S.E. 2d 378, 382-83 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980).
122. See Portuguese-Amer. Bank v. Welles, 242 U.S. 7, 10-12 (1916); Fox-Greenwald Sheet
Metal Co. v. Markowitz Bros., Inc., 452 F.2d 1346, 1351-52, 1355-56 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Frank
Sullivan Co. v. Midwest Sheet Metal Works, 335 F.2d 33, 39 (8th Cir. 1964); Paxson v. Commis-
sioner, 144 F.2d 772, 775 (3d Cir. 1944). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS:
ASSIGNMENT & DELEGATION § 322(2)(C) (1981); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 176 (1932)
(stating that “[a] prohibition in a contract of the assignment of rights thereunder is for the
benefit of the obligor and does not prevent the assignee from acquiring rights against the as-
signor by the assignment or the obligor from discharging his duty under the contract in any way
permissible if there were no such prohibition.”).
123. See sources cited supra note 122.
124. See Cedar Points Apts. v. Cedar Point Inv. Corp., 693 F.2d 748, 754 (8th Cir. 1982).
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chose in action is not necessary to preserve the priority of right as be-
tween bona fide assignees of an assignment of such chose in action..125
Courts applying the American rule generally state that any subse-
quent assignee has no better right to a chose in action than his as-
signor; and, if the assignor has previously assigned such rights, there
remains no title or right to pass to the subsequent assignee.  Conse-
quently, notice to the account debtor is irrelevant to a determination
of rights because the subsequent assignee has no such rights.126  . A
minority of jurisdictions in the United States do not follow the
American rule, however, but instead adopt the “English rule.”127  The
English rule provides that priority as between bona fide assignees is
determined by the first assignee to give notice to the debtor of the as-
signment.128
Any legal system may be chosen to govern an assignment; it is
generally not necessary to choose the same law that governs the un-
derlying loan contract or choses in action arising under that contract.
The law of the underlying contract, however, will generally determine
whether the chose in action arising under the contract is capable of
assignment.  If the chose in action is assignable, the law of the un-
derlying contract will also determine whether other formalities are
necessary129 to ensure the enforceability of such assignment and the
priorities of competing assignees.130 . In some jurisdictions, the law
applicable to a resolution of such issues may not be determined sim-
ply by reference to the governing law clause in the underlying con-
tract.131  For example, under the law of the United States, a determi-
125. See, e.g., Salem Trust Co. v. Manufactures’ Fin. Co., 264 U.S. 182 (1923); In re Rosen,
157 F.2d 997 (3d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 835 (1947). See generally 110 A.L.R. 774, 775-
78 (1937) (discussing American rule cases).
126. See, e.g., Salem Trust Co. v. Manufactures’ Fin. Co., 264 U.S. at 182 (discussing ration-
ale for American rule).
127. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 955.1 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998) (expressly prescribing
that, as between bona fide assignees, “the assignee first giving notice thereof to the obligor in
writing has priority.”).
128. See, e.g., Costello v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n, 141 F. Supp. 225 (N.D. Cal.
1956), aff’d. 246 F.2d 807 (9th Cir. 1957). See generally 110 A.L.R. at 774-775 (discussing Eng-
lish rule cases).
129. An example of a necessary formality would be notice to the obligor.
130. Under English law, the priorities of competing successive assignees under assignments
of choses in action is governed by Dearle v. Hall, 38 Eng. Rep. 475 (Ch. 1828), which provided
that the first assignee to give notice of his interest to the underlying debtor has priority—
irrespective of the date of the assignment under which he claims—if the assignee entered into
the assignment in good faith and without notice of any earlier assignment.
131. See Gray v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 280 F.2d 549, 553-54 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1960); In re
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nation of the relative priorities between a non-notifying assignee and
a subsequent assignee may be dependent upon the place of perform-
ance of the contract of assignment.  The place of performance of a
contract of assignment, while not clearly delineated in the case law,
appears to be the jurisdiction where the assignment is made or where
the assignor is located.132  .
In some legal systems, perfection of the assignment by notifica-
tion to the underlying debtor must be effected according to the pro-
cedural rules of the forum in which the debtor is incorporated or
resident.  In many civil law jurisdictions, this will involve either ob-
taining the consent of the debtor, or serving notice of assignment on
the debtor through a court bailiff or by registered post, both of which
will be expensive.133  Under Article 12 of the Rome Convention on
the Law Applicable to Contracts, which has been adopted by most
Member States of the EU, the law governing the right assigned134 will
determine: 1) the capability of a right to be assigned; 2) the condi-
tions under which a right is assignable; 3) the relationship between
the assignee and the debtor; 4) the conditions under which the as-
signment can be invoked against the debtor; and 5) the discharge of
the debtor’s obligations.135  Article 12 is interpreted to mean that the
law under which the assigned right is created governs issues such as
perfection against the debtor, priorities between competing assignees
and the effect of a discharge.136  This may be a different legal system
from that which governs the contract of assignment itself, and the
mutual obligations of the assignor and the assignee.137  However, there
Rosen, 157 F.2d 997, 999 (3d. Cir. 1946); Wishnick v. Preserves & Honey, Inc., 275 N.Y.S. 420,
422 (Sup. Ct. 1934), aff’d. 285 N.Y.S. 522 (App. Div.), rev’d on other grounds, 5 N.E. 2d 808
(N.Y. 1936).
132. See Gray v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 280 F.2d at 553-54 & n.2; In re Rosen, 157 F.2d
at 999; Wishnick v. Preserves & Honey, Inc., 275 N.Y.S. at 422, aff’d. 285 N.Y.S. 522 (App.
Div.), rev’d on other grounds, 5 N.E. 2d 808 (N.Y. 1936).
133. See, e.g., C. CIV. art. 1690 (Fr.).
134. In the case of a receivable, it will generally be the proper law of the contract under
which the right was created.
135. See European Communities Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obliga-
tions, June 19, 1980, art. 12, 19 I.L.M. 1492 (1980) [hereinafter Convention on the Law Appli-
cable to Contracts].
136. For the application of English conflict of law rules, see 2 ALBERT V. DICEY & JOHN
H.C. MORRIS, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS Rule 120, at 979 (Lawrence Collins et al. eds., 12th ed.
1993).
137. The same result would arise under English common law principles of conflict of laws,
which will apply to all contracts governed by English law and entered into on or prior to April
1, 1991.
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is very little case law on the interpretation of Article 12.138
C.  Participation
It is important to note that a “participation” under U.S. law will
have different legal consequences from a “sub-participation” under
English law.  In English law, the term “participation” does not have a
distinct legal connotation, but can be used to mean a number of dif-
ferent things.  Sub-participation, on the other hand, has a distinct
meaning: a sub-participation represents a purely contractual funding
arrangement whereby one party, the “sub-participant,” agrees to
fund a loan asset of another institution, the “seller.”139 This funding
arrangement may take one of two forms.  The first form is a “funded”
sub-participation, where the sub-participant deposits money with the
seller which may only be repaid as and when the underlying asset
pays interest or principal.  The second form is an “unfunded” sub-
participation, in which the sub-participant pays no money up-front to
the seller, but agrees to pay either as the related loan is drawn down,
or if and when the underlying asset defaults.140  The risk weighting of
a sub-participation will depend on whether it is a funded or unfunded
sub-participation.  A funded sub-participation will be treated as a
138. But see the decision of the Dutch Supreme Court in Brandasma q.q. v. Hansa Chemie
AG, Hoge Raad der Nederlanden, 16 mei 1997, RvdW, 126, in which the Court held that Arti-
cle 12, paragraph 1 of the Convention on the Law Applicable to Contracts (which provides that
the mutual obligations of the assignor and assignee under an assignment of a right against an-
other person (the “debtor”) shall be governed by the law which under the Rome Convention
applies to the contract as between the assignor and the assignee) applies not only to the con-
tract of assignment between the assignor and the assignee, but also to the assignment itself (i.e.,
under Dutch law, the legal act that accomplishes the transfer of the assigned right from the as-
signor to the assignee).  The assignment in question was made between a Dutch assignor and a
German assignee under a contract of assignment governed by German law.  As a matter of
German law, there had been compliance with the formal requirements for a valid assignment as
between assignor and assignee.  However, as a matter of Dutch law, there had been no compli-
ance with the formal requirements for a valid assignment.  The court held that, as a matter of
Dutch law, the law governing the contract of assignment should also govern the assignment
itself (a different legal right), and thus, that as German law governed the contract of assign-
ment, the validity and effect of the assignment itself should be determined by reference to
German law.  As noted above, the assignment was valid under German law.  It is unlikely,
however, that this decision will have any bearing on the relationship between the assignee of a
right and the debtor in respect of that right, which relationship should be determined on the
basis of the law governing the right.  See generally Convention on the Law Applicable to Con-
tracts, supra note 135.
139. See, e.g., Notice BSD/1989/1, supra note 46 & Annex.
140. In which case it acts as a guarantee.
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claim collateralized by cash,141 so it will be risk-weighted at zero per-
cent.142 An unfunded sub-participation will be risk-weighted accord-
ing to the risk-weighting of the sub-participant, which in the case of
an SPV means a risk weighting of one hundred percent. If the un-
funded sub-participation relates to an undrawn commitment, it will
be risk-weighted at fifty percent if the commitment period exceeds
365 days, and zero percent if the commitment period is 365 days or
less.143
Under English law, the sub-participant never acquires any pro-
prietary interest in the underlying asset.  The sub-participant’s rights
are represented purely by its contract with the seller, even if the
seller becomes insolvent.  In these circumstances, the sub-participant
cannot claim any interest in either the loan asset itself, which will be-
come part of the bankruptcy estate of the seller, or any of the pro-
ceeds of payment realized from the asset.144  The sub-participant
never acquires any rights or interest against the underlying debtors,
and it remains vulnerable to rights of set-off available to the under-
lying debtors against the bank “selling” the participation.145  In order
to give some protection to sub-participants, banks may be asked by
the sub-participant to declare a trust over the proceeds of payments
received from underlying debtors.  The sub-participant is still not ac-
quiring a proprietary interest in the asset itself, but only the proceeds
of payment of that asset.146   Subject to the provisions of the underly-
ing documents,147 and to the bank’ s existing funding documents,148
banks may declare a trust over both the loan assets and the proceeds
of those assets.  A mechanic may also be incorporated in the sub-
participation documentation for such a trust to be established if cer-
tain thresholds—such as the bank’s own independent credit rating—
141. Which would be provided by the sub-participant.
142. See Basle Accord, supra note 3, at para. 42 & Annex 3.  See also Solvency Ratio Direc-
tive, supra note 24, art. 6(2) & Annex I.
143. See sources cited supra note 142.
144. There is no specific case law involving the sales of sub-participations by banks. The
principles stated in this section derive from general common law principles relating to the law
of contract.
145. See, e.g., Glegg v. Bromley [1912] 3 K.B. 474 (C.A.); In re Irving. Ex parte Brett, 7 Ch.
D. 419 (Ch. App. 1877).
146. See id.
147. The provisions of the underlying document may prohibit assignment or the transfer of
proprietary interests
148. The bank’s existing funding documents may contain negative pledge or anti-disposal
clauses that may be tripped by the establishment of a trust structure.
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are crossed.
In the United States, the proper legal classification of loan par-
ticipations in the event of the insolvency of the lead lender has been
debated for years.  For example, courts have characterized loan par-
ticipations as assignments, sales, trusts, tenancies in common,
debtor/creditor relationships, joint ventures or combinations of the
foregoing.149  The determination of whether a loan asset subject to a
participation constitutes property of the Originator is subject to ap-
plicable state law.150  Under New York law, the court first reviews the
written agreement to determine the intent of the parties; unless the
written agreement is ambiguous, the agreement will be dispositive of
such intent.151  Unambiguous intent to create a sale, however, will not
necessarily lead to a conclusion that such a sale has occurred if the
economic elements of the transaction are inconsistent with such
characterization.152  In assessing the economic substance of the trans-
action, the courts generally examine a number of factors.  Different
courts may apply different factors or may give the same factors dif-
ferent weights when considering the status of participations.  Perhaps
the most significant of these factors is whether the Originator trans-
ferred the risks of ownership of the loans to the SPV.153.  Accordingly,
a participation agreement that obligates the Originator to compen-
sate the SPV if a loan obligation is not paid when due is unlikely to
be viewed as having transferred risks of ownership to the SPV.154
In some instances, a participation agreement may be viewed as
not having transferred sufficient ownership rights to the SPV to man-
date sale characterization.155  Examples of such instances include the
149. See, e.g., Debora L. Threedy, Loan Participations—Sales Or Loans? Or Is That The
Question? 68 OR. L. REV. 649 (1989).
150. See Superintendent of Banks v. CITIC Indus. Bank (In re New York Agency), 645
N.Y.S.2d 779 (App. Div. 1996), appealed in part and affirmed, 683 N.E. 2d 756 (N.Y. 1997).  See
also Barnhill v. Johnson, 112 S. Ct. 1386, 1389 (1992).
151. See Eastern Sys. Inc. v. West 45th St. Industr. Condominium Inc. (In re Eastern Sys-
tems, Inc.), 105 B.R. 219, 228 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff’d, 1991 WL 90733 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
152. See Fireman’s Fund Ins. Cos. v. Grover (In re Woodson Co.), 813 F.2d 266, 272 (9th
Cir. 1987); Liona Corp., N.V. v. PCH Associates (In re PCH Associates), 804 F.3d 193, 199 (2d
Cir. 1986).
153. See, e.g., European Amer. Bank v. Sackman Mortgage Corp. (In re Sackman Mortgage
Corp.), 158 B.R. 926, 932 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993).
154. See, e.g., In re Coronet Capital Co., 142 B.R. 78, 80 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992); Fireman’s
Fund Ins. Cos. v. Grover (In re Woodson Co.), 813 F.2d 266, 271 (9th Cir. 1987); Northern
Trust Co. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Co., 619 F. Supp. 1340, 1341  (W.D. Okla. 1985).
155. See, e.g., In re Coronet Capital Co., 142 B.R. at 80; In re Woodson Co., 813 F.2d at 271;
Northern Trust Co. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Co., 619 F. Supp. at 1341.
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following: a participation agreement that 1) has a term shorter than
that of the underlying loans; 2) provides for different payment terms
between the borrower and the SPV; 3) permits the Originator to re-
tain more than its pro rata share of the interest payments on the
loans subject to the participation; or 4) grants the Originator the
unilateral right to change the terms of the loan or to repurchase the
loans subject to participation.  In structuring a corporate loan securi-
tization, it is not always possible to eliminate all factors that may
weigh against a sale characterization.  For example, notification to
the borrower of the transfer to the SPV would be a factor supporting
sale characterization, but is rarely present in securitization transac-
tions because of the Originator’s concern for its relationship with the
borrower. Counsel delivering a “true sale” opinion will typically alert
the recipient to the presence of these negative factors, but the over-
whelming presence of other factors that support a sale characteriza-
tion may permit the opinion to be rendered.
Even if a participation/sub-participation does not constitute the
sale of an asset in a legal sense, it is treated by the regulators in both
the United States and the United Kingdom. as a transfer of credit risk
for the purposes of risk-based capital requirements.156  The “sale” of
participations or sub-participations is the most popular form of trans-
fer used in CLO structures, partly because such “transfers” are sim-
pler from a legal perspective, and also because the “transfer” by sale
of a participation avoids issues presented by alienation provisions in
the underlying loan documentation.  As already mentioned, corpo-
rate loan assets are not homogenous; they are frequently not origi-
nated under standard forms in the same way as consumer assets are,
but under negotiated contracts.  In the case of syndicated loan
agreements, it is even more likely that key provisions of the docu-
ment, such as the assignment provision, will have been negotiated.157
Many corporate borrowers choose their financiers on the basis of re-
156. See Glossary to the Call Report, 3-97 edition, page A-49 (FFIEC 031, 032, 033 and
034).  Note, however, that sales of so-called “strip participations” (the “sale” of a short-term
loan under along-term credit commitment) will constitute a sale with recourse for purposes of
U.S. regulatory accounting, and will therefore not enable the seller to release the associated
risk-based capital.
157. The sale into a securitization structure of participations in syndicated loan agreements
raises a host of complex legal issues that are beyond the scope of this Article.  For example, the
Originator (and thus the SPV) will be subject to syndicate democracy rights restraining the
ability of a single lender to call a default under the agreement, and by the effect of pro rata
sharing clauses now standard in most syndicated loan agreements.
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lationship, reputation and their requirements for funding.  Similarly,
corporate borrowers will will arrange their financing in accordance
with a clear funding strategy.  Such a strategy may involve direct
capital markets financings, bank syndicates or bilateral lines of credit.
Having taken the time and trouble to build up a “bank group,” cor-
porate borrowers will also take the trouble to ensure that this group
will remain largely intact for the required funding period or, if par-
ticular lenders withdraw from the facilities, that they are replaced
with equally acceptable lending institutions.
While corporate loan agreements are likely to contain restric-
tions on the novation or assignment of loan assets, restrictions on
participations are less likely.  This is true, provided that the agree-
ment is clear that any such participation is a contractual funding ar-
rangement by a lending bank, and it will not result in the borrower
having a direct contractual relationship with the participant.
Frequently, assignment is permitted provided that the bor-
rower’s consent is obtained, and provided that the assignee is a bank.
This may be particularly important for withholding tax reasons.  For
example, companies in the United Kingdom are generally required to
withhold tax from interest payments unless the payment is made to a
bank recognized as such by the United Kingdom Inland Revenue.158
An SPV will not be recognized as a bank for the purposes of Section
349 of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act of 1988, and although
the loan documentation will invariably contain a gross-up clause,
most well-negotiated assignment provisions will prohibit assignments
that would result in the borrower paying more under tax indemnities
or gross-up provisions.159  A participation in a loan will not trip any
withholding tax requirements between the underlying debtor and the
assignee, because there is no contractual relationship there.  On the
other hand, banks are usually exempted from withholding tax on
payments they make on their own debt service, which would include
for these purposes payments to participants.
Similarly, borrowers will wish to ensure that the admission of a
new lender will not result in higher costs for its funding generally, or
under general indemnities or increased costs clauses. Increased cost
clauses, as currently drafted in most corporate loan documents, are
158. See Income and Corporation Taxes Act, 1988, ch. 1 § 349 (Eng.) (as amended).
159. Under general equitable principles, unless varied by contract the debtor should not in
any event be prejudiced by an assignment of his debt.  See, e.g., Dawson v. Great N. & City Ry.
Co. [1905] 1 K.B. 260 (C.A. 1904).
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unlikely to be affected by the introduction of an SPV to the funding
group because, superficially at least, the SPV itself will not incur in-
creased “capital costs” because it will not be a regulated entity sub-
ject to a capital adequacy requirement.  However, the SPV may be
reliant on third party facilities such as liquidity facilities or credit en-
hancement facilities provided by entities which are subject to capital
adequacy requirements.  Therefore, the SPV’s own funding costs will
depend, to this extent, on the cost of capital factored into the pricing
of these third party facilities.  Standard increased cost clauses cur-
rently used in the documentation for corporate loans are unlikely to
cover an increase in the SPV’s cost of funds caused by a repricing of
third party facilities as a consequence of a change to the risk weight-
ing of these facilities.  Also, if the SPV’s funding is of a short-term
nature160 any disruption in the renewal of this financing source may
result in the SPV relying on second line sources such as liquidity fa-
cilities.  For this reason, the loans selected for inclusion in a securiti-
zation program should generally bear interest at a rate at least equal
to the SPV’s cost of funds under the drawn liquidity facilities.
IV.  BANKER’S DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY
Some legal systems impose strict duties of confidentiality on
banks and other financial institutions in possession of sensitive finan-
cial information.161  The duty of confidentiality may arise under vari-
ous different legal headings.  In common law jurisdictions, there is
generally a common law duty of confidentiality as well as more re-
cent statutory duties, particularly relating to data protection;162 in civil
law jurisdictions, the duty may arise under the civil code or under
general principles of constitutional law.  Under English common law,
the duty of confidentiality derives from the contractual relationship
between a bank and its customer, and extends to all information ac-
quired by the bank during the course of the banker-customer rela-
tionship.163 Remedies for breach will be measured and awarded,
therefore, on a contractual basis.  The English common law provides
four exceptions to the overriding duty of bankers to abide by their
160. Such as commercial paper.
161. See, e.g., Data Protection Act, 1984, ch. 35, (Eng.). See also Tournier v. Nat’l Provin-
cial and Union Bank of England [1924] 1 KB 461 (C.A. 1923).
162. See, e.g., Data Protection Act, 1984, ch. 35, (Eng.).
163. See Tournier v. Nat’l Provincial and Union Bank of England [1924] 1 KB 461 (C.A.
1923).
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duty of confidentiality.  These exceptions include disclosure that is
expressly or impliedly permitted by the customer, and disclosure that
is required in the interests of the bank.164  None of the four exemp-
tions, however, provides a clear-cut safe haven for banks which need
to release customer information for the purposes of a securitization
transaction.165  In addition, the underlying loan documentation must
be reviewed to determine the scope of the contractual provisions re-
lating to the disclosure of information.  Such contractual exceptions
may be limited to information directly related to the loan agreement,
or may extend to unrelated, but sensitive, general commercial infor-
mation concerning a borrower.
There are a number of parties to a securitization transaction who
may need potentially confidential information concerning the un-
derlying assets.  Such parties include the SPV and its directors, the
rating agencies rating the transaction, any liquidity banks providing
liquidity facilities backing up commercial paper, the trustee for the
debt holders, and the servicing agent166 appointed by the SPV to
service and enforce the loan assets.
For example, a rating agency may need potentially confidential
information because the credit rating of the securitization transaction
partially depends on an analysis of the underlying corporate loans.167
In addition, in order to achieve a balanced portfolio without undue
concentration in any particular economic or industrial sector or in
any particular borrower or group of connected borrowers, the rating
agencies will insist on disclosure of the portfolio’s financial charac-
teristics.  To date, this has been achieved by supplying rating agencies
with encrypted data (unless particular borrowers account for a sig-
nificant portion of the securitized portfolio),168 in which case the agen-
cies will insist on named disclosure.  In the case of investment grade
borrowers who have their own corporate debt rated by the rating
agencies, it is unlikely that they could claim damages for the disclo-
sure of confidential information by the Originator to rating agencies.
Such a claim for damages would be unlikely because the borrowers
164. See id.
165. Although in principle it might be argued that a bank may rely on the “interests of the
bank” exemption in order to permit disclosure of confidential information, this appears to be
self-serving, particularly in the context of a large-scale securitization.
166. The servicing agent typically is the Originator, unless replaced following its insolvency
or breach of its obligations as servicer.
167. See sources cited supra note 1.
168. Such as a loan asset in excess of five percent of the overall portfolio size.
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have provided the rating agencies with much the same—and probably
more—financial information on themselves.
In addition, corporate entities that list their stock or debt on
public exchanges are generally obligated to file their annual audited
accounts with a public authority for inspection by the public.  There-
fore, their general levels of indebtedness will be public information.
More corporate information is likely to come into the public domain
as the bond markets, particularly in Europe, open up to weaker cred-
its.  A more difficult scenario will arise if, after the securitization, a
borrower defaults on a debt that has been securitized.  This default is
not likely to be information immediately available to the public, nor
is it information that would immediately be disclosed to a rating
agency, unless by the borrower itself.  Under English law, informa-
tion relating to the default itself and provided as a consequence of
the default is likely to be impressed with a duty of confidentiality, ei-
ther by contract169 or under the common law principle that a duty of
confidence arises when confidential information is provided in cir-
cumstances where the recipient has notice that it is confidential.170 In
addition, the Originator may want to delay publication of such de-
fault to allow the Originator to negotiate with the borrower before
other creditors become aware of the default.171  Under this scenario, it
is likely that the Originator will choose not to disclose the identity of
the defaulting borrower, but only the amount defaulted, or it will dis-
close the identity only to the trustee172 appointed under the SPV’s
trust deed or indenture.
If the securitization transaction includes a variable funding op-
tion that is supported by a liquidity facility extended by other com-
mercial banks, the Originator will resist disclosure of the borrowers’
169. See Tournier v. Nat’l Provincial and Union Bank of England [1924] 1 KB 461 (C.A.
1923).
170. See CLERK & LINDSELL ON TORTS para. 26.01 (R.W.M. Dias et al. eds., 17th ed. 1995).
171. The ability to do this will depend on the terms of other loan agreements by which the
borrower is bound:  They may contain cross default clauses that have been triggered in any
event.
172. Trustees are generally financial institutions with a statutory or fiduciary duty to pre-
serve the confidentiality of information provided to them.  A number of legal jurisdictions
permit disclosure of otherwise confidential information to persons who are themselves subject
to a duty of confidentiality, such as auditors and legal advisors.  See, e.g., BAK CIRCULAR, su-
pra note 51, art. III.
It is generally thought safe, therefore, to permit disclosure to trustees, in their capacity
as such, although there is no clear exemption provided for such disclosure in most legal sys-
tems.
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identities to such liquidity providers on both legal and commercial
grounds.  For example, an Originator will not want its potential com-
petitors (i.e., the liquidity providers) to gain any insight into its cor-
porate loan portfolio.  In addition, liquidity providers are not in-
tended to take any credit risk on the underlying assets, so the
Originator may argue with some logic that the composition of the se-
curitized portfolio should be largely irrelevant to the liquidity banks.
To the extent the composition is relevant, the trustee typically holds
the required information and reveals it to the liquidity provider only
under very rare circumstances.
Furthermore, if it were a normal trading company, the SPV
would also ordinarily insist on knowing the identity of the underlying
borrowers.  In addition, the SPV directors, under general principles
of company law, would be lacking in their fiduciary duties to the
company if they did not satisfy themselves as to the credit quality of
the securitized portfolio, or had at least verified that the assets securi-
tized complied with the eligibility criteria established for the securiti-
zation.  In practice, this verification process will be undertaken either
by the trustee, who will know the identity of the underlying debtors,
or by the Originator’s external auditors, who are subject to a duty of
professional confidence.  The SPV will receive the same portfolio-
wide information and encrypted information on individual loans as
do the rating agencies, but the list of actual borrowers is delivered
only to the trustee.
As previously noted, the underlying corporate loan documents
must be reviewed to identify any contractual restrictions on disclo-
sure.  Such restrictions may prevent disclosure even to trustees, and
thus render the assets ineligible for securitization.  Banks that may
wish to securitize their assets in the future would benefit from taking
immediate steps to standardize the assignment and disclosure clauses
in their documentation to avoid the described limitations.
V.  LICENSING REQUIREMENTS ON THE SPV
The final legal aspect of securitization examined by this article is
whether there are any licensing or regulatory requirements binding
on the SPV.173  The objective in securitizing is to release risk-based
173. We assume for these purposes that none of the corporate loans are subject to con-
sumer credit legislation in any jurisdiction (ordinarily consumer credit legislation does not ex-
tend to protect corporate borrowers).
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capital and/or achieve a lower cost of funds for the securitized as-
sets.174  If the SPV is subject to regulation or licensing requirements,
compliance with these requirements may increase its funding costs to
an extent that renders it economically unsustainable.
In some jurisdictions, however, lending may be a regulated ac-
tivity even if the lender does not accept deposits.  Still, with any
cross-border securitization, the only prudent course to follow is to
examine the rules in each jurisdiction in which a borrower is located
to ensure that an SPV may legally lend there.  In addition, the juris-
dictional problem may be avoided if a participation structure is used.
In the United Kingdom, Bank of England regulations apply only
to entities that take deposits from the public within the meaning of
Sections 5 and 6 of the Banking Act of 1987.175  In the United States,
regulation is also focused primarily on entities that raise their funds
from deposit-taking activities, so an SPV should not generally be
subject to regulation by a federal entity such as the FDIC.  However,
it is important to carefully monitor the amount of lending that the
SPV makes to borrowers in a particular state.  Persistent business ac-
tivity in a state, such a regular lending to a number of borrowers lo-
cated in that state, may trigger “doing business” legislation.  Doing
business legislation requires, among other things, registration with a
state agency.  In addition, it is important to ensure that the debt is-
sued by the SPV is not treated as the acceptance of public deposits.
This is definitely an issue in the United Kingdom, primarily because
of the broad definitions of “deposit” and “deposit-taking business” in
the Banking Act of 1987.176
In addition, there are strict rules in England that apply to the is-
suance of Sterling commercial paper and other longer term debt
through the capital markets.  The rules regarding the issuance of
commercial paper will prevent most SPVs from issuing such debt, ex-
cept where the issue is made pursuant to debt issuance programs
listed on a recognized stock exchange.177  The use of an English law
sub-participation structure, whereby the SPV acquires no contractual
174. See sources cited supra note 1.
175. See Banking Act, 1987, ch. 22, §§ 5-6 (Eng.).
176. See the Bank of England’s Notice dated Mar. 18, 1997, entitled The Bank of England
(Exempt Transactions) Regulations 1997 and issues of Commercial Paper, applicable from Apr.
3, 1997, and, for medium-term debt issuances, the Bank of England’s Notice dated Mar. 18,
1997, entitled Issues of Debt Securities of One Year or Over under The Bank of England
(Exempt Transactions) Regulations 1997, applicable from Apr. 3, 1997.
177. See id.
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or proprietary rights against the underlying debtors, will usually
avoid the need for the SPV to comply with local licensing require-
ments relating to lending activities.  However, the SPV may still need
to obtain certain licenses.  In Europe, for example, a data protection
license may be required before the SPV may retain computer data on
individuals and, in some cases, on corporations.  Data on individuals
may be relevant even in the context of corporate loans if the corpora-
tion is family-owned or controlled, or if personal guarantees have
been given in respect of the corporation’s debt.
The final issue that may arise from an SPV’s unlicensed status is
that in some jurisdictions, interest payments to non-banks are subject
to a withholding tax.178  It is most unlikely that a corporate borrower
would agree to a securitization of its loan in circumstances where it
becomes required to gross-up its interest payments.  This would re-
main true despite the argument that the effect of a gross-up is not to
increase the cost of borrowing, but is it rather a timing issue, since the
person making the gross-up will eventually receive a tax credit.
VI. CONCLUSION
The dramatic growth in the use of securitization to fund corpo-
rate loan assets suggests that this is a form of financing that is here to
stay.  However, the process of securitizing complex and non-
homogenous assets gives rise to a number of legal and structural
complexities.  It is not possible to identify all the issues that will arise
in the context of a corporate loan securitization, but this Article has
provided important insights into the principal concerns that must be
addressed.
178. See Income and Corporation Taxes Act, 1988, ch. 1 § 349 (2) (Eng.) (as amended).
